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Merging of the Islands of Information Services
James L. Mci<enney
Harvard Business School

F. Warren McFarlan
Harvard Business School
The Vice President of Services of a large
durables manufacturing firm recently
faced a di lemma. She had just discovered

that her request for a stand alone word

processor to solve operating problems in

her fastest growing sales office had been
denied. It seemed a tivial request, yet its
review created a mess and she felt the
decision a dangerous precedent.
The

reason given for the denial was incompatibility with the division system's plan.
When she had asked why it was incompatible, an incomprehensible series of technical arguments ensued which appeared to
have no relationship to her very real productivity problem. Should she fall in line,
fight the decision, or resubmit the request
as an operating expense instead of a capitai expenditure?
A major manufacturing company over the

past four years has reduced the hardware
processing capacity and staffing of its corporate data processing center by 60%.
Dramatic growth, however, has taken place
in divisional data centers to such an extent
that

overa 11

corporate

data

1980's must include office automation,
data and voice communications, and data
processing, managed in a coordinated and,
in many situations, an integrated manner.
Development of this coordination will not
be easy in many organizations as each of
these activities in the 1960's and 1970's not
only had different technical bases, but
were marketed to the company quite
separately.
Internally, quite different
organization structures and practices
handling them developed.

Further, the complexity and size of office
automation investments is such that they
now require a systems study simi lar to

those done for data processing, instead of

the former routine expense approval.

Similarly, telecommunications investments

now involve large capital investment and
multiple vendors instead of a routine upgrading of monthly expenses from the
public utility. In addition, many appli-

cations require the physical interconnection of data processing, telecommunicalions, and office automation.

processing

expenditures have risen more than 50%
during the period.

The key driving force of change has been
innovation in the speed and cost of electronic design and manufacture. In twenty

After careful analysis, senior staff of a

years, dramatic strides have occurred as

major decentralized company recommends
an orderly dissolution of the company's $25
mi I I ion data center and the creation of
eight smaller diversified data centers over
(] thirty month period.

we moved from the vacuum tube to the
very large scale integrated circuits. These
productivity changes are continuing as sti 11
smaller, more reliable useful circuits are
being developed. Table I shows the cost

For reasons of both efficiency and effectiveness, in the 1980's Information Services
must embrace different functions than in
the 1970's. Information services in the

the past twenty years, trends which wi li
continue for the next decade. The cost
reduction and capacity increases, caused

trends per individual unit and circuit over

by these changes, have reduced computer
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Table 1.

Costs and Performance of Electronics

1958
Technology

1965

Vaccuum Tube

1962

1980

Transistor

Integrated

LSIC

$/Unit

$8

. 25

.02

.001

$/Logic

$160

$12

$200

$.05

Operation
Time

16x 10-3

4x 10-6

200x10 -12

40x 10-9

viduals either responsible for operating this
technology, developing new applications, or
maintaining them.

hardware cost as a fraction of total DP
department cost below 30% in most large
data processing environments.
Today,
computer costs often do not exceed com-

This is the first of three articles identifying the critical managerial issues emerging
from those changes in information services. This art icle considers the organiza-

munications expense, and for many firms
are significantly less than software development and maintenance charges. Equally
significant, this technology has permitted
development of stand alone "minicomputer
systems" or "office automation systems"
which can be tai lored to speci fic service
for any desired location, and which are
physically separate from the central DP
site.

tional

implications

of

managing

more

closely the technological services of office
automation, telecommunication, and data
processing in a world of expanding products

and technical change. The second article
considers the range of necessary policies
important for the orderly management of
productive information services in the
1980's. Special attention is given to the

This changed technology has permitted a
dramatic shift in both the type of information services being delivered and the best
organizational structure for delivering

problems of stand alone islands of automation or mini-computers.
The final

them. This shift has and will involve not
only the coordination of data processing,

article examines information services planning, and how it can be done more effec-

teleprocessing, and office automation, but

tively.

redeployment of both physical location and
organizational

placement

of

the

firm's

SPECIAL INFORMATION SERVICES

technical and staff resources that provide
information services.
By technical

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

resources we mean items such as computers, word processors, private telephone

In 1981, several issues, in addition to the

exchanges, and intell igent terminals.

convergence of their technologies, have

In

staff resources, we include all the indi-

propelled the need for reexamination of
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how information services can be most effectively organized inside the firm. The

government-owned system, they
may develop a more cost-effective

most important of those issues are the

environment.

following.

and other parts of the globe, these

1.

problems are further compounded
by reliability problems.
For
example, one South American
company was forced to shut down a
sophisticated onl ine system supporting multiple branches because
of unplanned, unacceptable breakdowns (sometimes more than
twenty-four hours in duration). In
another situation, the company was
able to achieve acceptable reliabil-

An increasing shortage of competent ski I led people in the USA in
relation to the need to translate

this technology into ongoing systems and processes within organizat ions. These shortages, severe in
1981, will worsen in the coming
decade for the fol lowing reasons:

o The number of individuals reaching their 18th birthday is esti-

mated to plunge by 27% in the

ity only by gaining permission to
construct and maintain its own

twenty years between 1978 and

network of microwave towers.

1998.
3.

o The 15% decline in Scholastic
Aptitude test scores in the past
decade and the reworking and
simplification of college freshman curricula.

the edit/typing function to gain

operating efficiencies into one of

reorganizing the total flow of the

work in administrative areas of the
company nationwide. The poten-

tial productivity increases offered

major universities.

The development of highly reliable,
cheap digital telecommunication
systems in the USA and expanding
growth in Europe. The economics
and reliability of worldwide telecommunications, however, are not

consistent with the USA representing a unique environment for

the immediate future. In Western

The exploding growth of office
systems products,
with even
greater functional performance
and lower cost. For example, the
recent connection of word processing stations into telecommunicotion networks has converted the
simple opportunity of automating

o The shrinking availability of professional information systems
curriculum as potential faculty
choose industry over university
careers. In the spring of 1981,
over 100 unfilled openings in
information systems existed in
2.

In Latin America

by this technology are only beginning to be realized in most organizations.

4.

Legitimate demand for information
services support by users continues
to vastly exceed avai lable supply.
Supplies of cost-justified applications waiting to be implemented
exceeding available staff resources
by three or more years, tend to be

Europe, tariffs run an order of

the norm rather than the excep-

magnitude more than those in the
USA, often coupled with inordinate

tion. This has created widespread
user frustration.
Further, per-

installation delays once an order is
planned.
However, as European
countries better coordinate their

ceived unsatisfactory support and
unhappy interpersonal
contacts
with the central information ser-

333

vices organization continues to

three years ago.
Further, no
serious student of the field
believes that the pace of Nnproved
performance in these devices wi 11
slow in the next ten years. As with
all technologies, a point of maturity will be reached but we are not

This has increased the
users' natural desire to gain control
persist.

over this aspect of their work. The
new technologies increasingly permit users to gain this control. In
addition, users' confidence in their

ability to run o computer (through
personal

experience,

such

as

yet close to it.

a

home APPLE for example) is not
only growing but is likely to continue to grow (adinittedly an often
unwarranted self-confidence).

5.

A fundamental conceptual shift has

Many of today's managerial issues are a
result of past management practices relat-

occurred in computer based sys-

ing to these technologies (as shown in

tems design phi losophy. The prevailing practice in the 1960's and

Table 2); the following paragraphs analyze
this data in more depth.

early '709 involved writing computer programs which intermixed
data processing instructions and
data elements within the computer
program structure. In the 1980's

world, the Tranagement of data

elements is clearly separated from
the computer program instructions.
This implementation of shift has
placed
on
enormous
pressure
information services organizations

as they balance investing human
resources in new systems developments versus redesign of old
systems, while ensuring reliable
operation of the old systems until
the updated ones can be installed.
6.

SOURCE OF CURRENT MANAGERIAL
CHALLENGE

Finally, there have not just been
sharp reductions in computing

costs, but also exploding breakthroughs in the cost and type of
peripheral and other input/output

devices which can be attached
directly or remotely to the computer. Of particular importance is
the continued dramatic reduction

in cost and increase in size of
secondary

storage.

This year's

volume of HBR could be sorted in

accessible format for less than $2
worth of memory versus $20,000

In 1920, an operational style of information
services in most corporations, elements of
which continue to this day, was in place.
The manager and his secretary were supported by three forms of information services, each composed of a different set of

technology. For word processing, the typewriter was the main engine for generating
legible words for distribution.
A file
cabinet served as the main storage device

for output, and the various organization
units were linked by secretaries moving
paper from one unit to another.
Data
processing, if automated at all, was dependent upon cart-sorting machines to develop
sums and balances using punched cards as
input. The cards served as memory for this
system.
The telecommunication system
involved wires and messages that were

manipulated by operator control of elec-

trical mechanical switches to connect
parties.
The telecommunication system

had no storage capacity. The jump from
1920 to 1965 marked a significant shif t in
data processing and little change in the
other two information services. In data
processing the computer replaced the cardsorting system of manipulation. This added

speed-of-light

electronic

memories

to

these functions and al lowed many of them

to be linked together into an automatically
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Table 2.

Functions
of the
Technology

Islands of Technology

Word

Data

Processing

Processing

Communication

Humanto
machine
translation

Shorthand/
Dictaphone

Form / Keypunch

Phone

Manipulation
of data

Typewriter

Cardsort

Switch

Memory

File Cabinet

Cards

None

Links

Secretary

Operator

Operator

Human to
machine
translation

Shorthand/
Dictaphone

Form/Keypunch

Phone

Manipulation

Typewriter

Computer

Computer

Memory

File cabinet

Computer

None

Links

Secretary

Computer

Computer

Human to
machine
translation

Shorthand/
Dictaphone

Typewriter

phone/typewriter

Manipulation

Computer

Computer.

Computer

Memory

Computer

Computer

Computer

Links

Computer

Computer

Computer

1920

1965

of data

1980

of data
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controlled process which delivered a wide
range of preprogrammed services to users.

tional issues. The roles required of people
providing each of these services
changed dramatically.

This technology both enabled an enormous
productivity increase in data processing
and permitted development of a range of
new services not originally envisioned.
Attendant to this, of course, was a host of
new management problems.
To cope,

In 1920, as shown in Table 3, the designer
of each of the three islands had significantly different roles. For word processing

the office manager directed the design,
heavi ly influenced by the whim of his/her
manager. Although office system studies
were emerging, word processing was primarily a means of facilitating secretarial
work. The prime means of obtaining new
equipment was through purchasing agents,
and involved selecting typewriters, dictaphones, and fi le cabinets from a wide
variety of medium-sized companies.
Standardization was not critical.
Data

managers learned to deal with data processing as a capital-intensive service which
required their attention.
Further, problems often emerged as a
result of one-time data processing design
decisions that had significant unforeseen
implications. For example, one firm, after
developing a special-purpose inventory
system for the shop, discovered to its

processing was the domain of the con-

horror that it could not link to any ac-

troller-accountant and the systems design
activity was carried out by either the chief
accountant or a card systems manager
whose job it was to design the protocols for

counting system. An insurance company,
after encouraging adaptation of a system
to a unique insurance policy at great cost,
then discovered the policy had lost sales

the flow of information to the processing

appeal inthe rnarket and therefore represented wasted effort.

have

steps. Both data processing and teleprocessing were sufficiently complex and
expensive that they required that managers
develop an explicit plan of action. Thus,

These incidents

helped managers to learn the importance

of system design and top management
review and, in general, to evolve through

the operation of both these systems was

the stages noted by Nolan (Nolan & Gibson,
1974). At this time, word processing and
office automation had undergone little
operational change and had received
limited management attention.
To the

dominated by individuals following a plan,
be it from machine to machine or an
operator connecting switches or transforming cards.

extent that attention was paid to it, it was
done by a manager of office services who
was far removed from the DP function. In

However, a key difference between data
processing and telephones starting in the

the communication system, technological
shifts were enormous. However, they were

essing was normally purchased and main-

1920's was that the service of data proc-

tained

unnoticed by most users as no decisions
were required and only limited management review was made as it was a purchased service.

from one supplier.

tionship existed between buyer and seller.

Teleprocessing, however, evolved as a purchased service. As AT&T had made avai 1able a network of cheaper inner city telephones, companies responded by ordering

The second technological jump, which took
place in one-third the time of the first,

the phones and the utility developed a

caused these formally isolated and inde-

pendent technological

as a system

Thus, from the beginning, a systems rela-

monopoly of the phone system. All three
islands, therefore, were served in a different manner in 1920; one by many com-

islands to pose

increasing similar managerial and technical
concerns, and generated complex organiza-
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Table 3.

Islands of Technology

Word
Processing

Processing

Communication

Design

0 ffice Mgr.

Card design

AT&T

Operate

Secretary

Machine Operator

AT&T

Maintain

Many Companies

Single supplier

AT&T

User

Manager

Accountant

Manager

Office System
Analyst

Systems
Analyst

AT&T

Operate

Secretary

Operator/Analyst

AT&T

Maintain

Many

Single supplier

AT&T

User

Manager

Manager/Accountant Everybody

Design

Systems Analyst

Systems Analyst

Operate

Mgr. /Secy. /Editor Mgr. /Secy. /

Roles of Use

Data

1920

1965
Design

1980
Systems Analyst

Mgr./Secy.

Secretary
Maintain

Many or single

IBM /other

AT &T /other

User

Everybody

Everybody

Everybody
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panies, one by a systems supplier, and one
by a public utility.
In 1965, the servicing and management of

all three islands was still institutionalized
in the 1920's patterns. Word processing
had a design content but was sti 11 very
much influenced by the manager and
centered around the secretary. Services
such as typewriters and reproducing
systems were purchased as independent
units from a range of competitors offering

similar technology. There was little oneterm planning, with designs and systems
evolving in response to new available technical units. Data processing, however, had
emerged as an ever more complex manageIt was dominated by a
ment process.
serious evaluation of major capital investments in computers and software, as well
as multiyear project management of the
design and development of systems supIn addition extensive training
port.
sessions for all employees and users were

required to effectively take advantage of

the productivity of the new system.

At

times, even the corporate organization was
changed to accommodate the new potential

prior expertise in handl ing this type of
problem. For office automation, a special
problem is the move from multiple vendors
with slamm individual dollar purchases to
one vendor that wi I I provide integrated
support. The size of the purchase decisions
and the complexi ty of the applications are
several orders of magnitude, larger and
more complex than those faced a decade

ago. For telecommunications, the problem
revolves around breaking the psychology of
relying on a purchased service decision
from a public utility, and looking at muitiple sources for large capital investment
decisions. In both cases, this represents a
sharp departure from past practices, and
creates needs for a type of management
ski 11 which fifteen years ago was added to
the data processing function.

The second I inkage to data processing is

that increasingly key sectors of all three
components are physically linked together
in a network; consequently the problems of
one component cannot be addressed independently of those of the other two components. For example, in one manufacturing company, the same WATS I ine over a

and problems caused by computer tech-

24-hour period is used to support online

nology. These changes were very much
influenced by the nature of the business
and its internal organization culture. For
communications, however, in 1965 AT&T
completely dominated the provision of
communication service and, from a user's

data communications from assembly-line

perspective, its management was a passive
purchase problem. In some organizations,
managing communications implied placing

terminals to the central computer, voice

communications, and finally, an electronic
The
mail message switching system.
potential I inkage of these technologies has
raised important organizational issues such
as:
1.

Should DP, given its expertise in
these management problems, be in
charge of office automation?

2.

Should data and voice communication be merged in a single department because of the common
sources of service and potential for

three minute hourglasses by phones to
reduce the length of calls.
By 1980, however, the management concerns for word processing and teleprocessing had become integrated with those of
data processing for two important reasons.
First, these areas also now require large
capital investments, large projects, large
complex implementation, and extensive
user training.
The managers of these
activities, however, had had no significant

cost savings?

3.
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Should control of telecommunicabe
systems acquisitions
tions
assigned to DP?

Unfortunately, the addressing of these concerns

all

too

often

appears

driven

The specific timing and nature of this
organizational merger, of course, will be
influenced by the very different history
abd consequent organizational status of
these different units within a company, the
speed at which the firm has been investing
in staying modern in these technologies,
individual career paths, and other general
organizational considerations. The direction of the trend is clear.

by

creation of new technology and lobbying of
one or more vendors, and are not placed in'
organizational perspective. In 1981, for
each of the three islands, a dominant supplier is attempting to market his product
island position as the natural technological
base from which the company can evolve
into coordinated automation of the other
islands. For example, IBM is attempting to
extend its data processing base into
products supporting office automation and
communication.
AT&T is attempting to
extend its communications base into
products support ing data processing and
office automation. Xerox is attempting to

,

PHASES OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSIMILATION
Organizations change much more slowly

expand its office automation effort into
communications and data processing.

than technology and must grow to produc-

In our judgment, failure to constructively
address these management issues poses

As Nolan demonstrated for data process-

great risk to an organization.

tively assimilate new information services.

ing, an organization progresses through
stages in assimi lating technology.

Over the

next few years, through addressing these
issues, we believe that those organizations
which have not already done so wi I I consolidate at least policy control and perhaps
management of the islands in a single
information services unit. The key reasons
for this include:
1.

learning cycle of adapting a technology to

an organization's needs (McKenney). Distressingly, there has been surprisingly poor
transfer of skills learned in managing the
DP stages of office automation. A recent
study of thirty-seven fi rms found thirty
had not bui It on their DP technology
experience when moving into word process-

Decisions in each area now involve
large amounts of money and complex

technical/cost

Simi lar

staff

evaluations.

backgrounds

ing and office automation (Curley, 1981).

are

Of equa I importance, over two-thirds had

needed to do the appropriate anal_

not progressed beyond Nolan's Stage 2 of

ysis in each case.

2.

automation of tasks and experimentation
with respect to word processing, and were

Great similarity exists in the type

in a state of arrested development.
Another study tracing an organization's use
of information services technologies in all

of project management ski I Is and
staff to implement applications of
these technologies.

3.

Many systems require the combined intertwining of these tech-

nologies into integrated networks
which comprise handling computing,
telecommunications,
and
office automation in an integrated
way.

Recent

work in office automation and data processing, has discovered this model to be a
special case of the broader problem of the

three components found four phases of

evolution which both relate to Nolan's
original stages and are consistent with
organizational change concepts developed
by Dr. Edgar Schien. These phases are
characterized in Table 4 as Investment/
Project Initiation, Technology Learning and
Adaptation, Rationalization, and Maturity.
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Table 4.

Phases of Technological Use

START

Phase 1 - Investment /Project
Initiation

A

Discovery of new A

Fanure

relevant technologies

Phase 2 - Technologi- Learn
and adaptive

g
Assimilation

Successf 1

Block A

Learn'
and Adop ion

Phase 3 - Mgm-.
Narrowly focused

Control

and not marketed
Assimilation

Block B

Efficiency
Dominated

Phase 4 - Widespread

Technc,logy

Transfer

Assimilation Block C

Technology

Solely Cost N inimization

Transfer
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The first phase is initiated by a decision to
invest in a new (to the organization) information processing technology, and involves
one or more complementary project development efforts, and initial individual training. The second phase seems to follow,

significant learning took place during
implementation. If the second phase is
managed in an adaptive manner that permits managers to capture, develop, and
refine new understanding of how this technology could be more helpful, the organiza-

unless there is a disaster in Phase 1, such

tion moves to phase three. Fai lure to learn

as vendor failure or poor user involvement
which results in Assimilation Block A.

tively disseminate this learning, leads to

from the first applications and to effec-

Assimilation Block B.
Assimilation Block A typically generates a
two-year lag before new investments in

A typical Assimilation Block B situation

occurred in a large manufacturing company
and involved automation of clerical word
processing activities which were under the
control of a very cost-conscious accounting
function.
Highly conservative in its
approach to technology in data processing,
the firm had developed automated
accounting systems centrally controlled in
a relatively outmoded computer operating

·this technology are tried again--normally
along with a complete change of personnel.
The decision to disinvest normally is a
result of increased work and little benefit

from the system; sources of these problems
range from vendor fai lure, lack of real
management attention, incompetent pro-

ject management, or merely bad choice.
Rarely are the problems leading to Assimilation Block A recognized quickly. The

system and had yet to enter into database

complexity and time requirements of

systems.
Having developed this narrow
word processing application to reduce

implementing new information technology
normally hides understanding of the developing failure for 18-36 months. The failure

costs, the department exhibited no interest
in expanding its scope beyond automating
the editing function in a typewriter.
Expertise has been gained but it was not
disseminated; consequently, over several
years the learning on how to introduce and
utilize this technology efficiently was lost.

typically is not a clear technological dis-

aster, but rather an ambiguous situation
which is perceived as adding more work to
the organization with little perceived
benefit. Hence, rejection of the system
follows. Ali projects studied which aborted
in Assimilation Block A had significant
cost overruns.
Each failure created
anxieties and prevented development of
coordinated momentum. Typically organizations frozen in this state end up purchasing more services of a familiar technology
and become relatively adept at adapting

this technology to this use.

Phase 3 typically involves a change in the
organization, continued evolution of the

uses of the technology to ones not originally considered, and, most important,
development of precise controls guiding

the design and implementation of systems
using these technologies to ensure latter
applications can be done more cost eff i-

They control

the loss of blood by preventing experimen-

ciently than the earlier one.

tation.

phase, control for efficiency does not
excessively dominate, and room for
broader objectives of effectiveness is left,
then the organization moves into a phase 4,
which involves broad based communication
and implementation of technology to other

The second phase involves learning how to
adapt the technology to particular tasks
beyond those identified in the initial proposal. In none of thirty-seven office automation sites studied was the first utilization of technology implemented as originally planned (Curley, 1981). In each case,

groups in the organization.

If, in this

Assimilation

Block C comes when excessive controls are

developed, which are so onerous as to
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inhibit the legitimate profitable expansion
of the use of the technology. An example

In a subsequent article, we will examine
how this notion of phase of technology
assimilation dramatically impacts the

of Assimilation Block C controlled system
use with respect to data processing was a
manufacturing company which entered into

appropriate ways to plan and control the

large scale centralization with distributed
input systems. To justify the expense of

text of this article, it is important because
it represents a major organizational chat-

information services function. In the conlenge. As the islands of technology merge,
for example, it is critical that the dominant phase 3 approach being used in the

the new operating system, it focused significant attention on gaining all the benefits of a very standardized, highly efficient
production shop. In the process of gaining
this efficiency the organization had
become so focused on standard procedures
and efficiency that it lost its ability and
enthusiasm for innovation and change with

technology of one island not be blindly and

incorrectly applied to the phase I and
phase 2 technologies in that island or in
another island. Not only has there been
difficulty in transforming appropriate
expertise from one island to another, but
often the wrong lessons are being transferred.

respect to this technology, and began to
actively discourage users. Further, the
rigorous protocols of these standard programs irritated their users and helped set

the stage for surreptitious local office

automation

initiation

In summary, organizations go through a
series of learning experiences to adapt
specific information technologies to their

experimentation,

phase I in a different technology. Too
rigorous an emphasis on control had prevented logical growth. The fi rst incident
described at the article's beginning was

needs. However, many organizations have
found it difficult to transfer the lessons

from one technology to another.

from that company.
Quite naturally as time passes, new technologies wi 11 emerge which offer the

opportunity either to move into new appli-

does not prematurely abort at an early

cation areas or to restructure old ones (see
Table 4). Each of the three components of

information services is thus confronted

A suc-

cessful cycle with one technology does not
necessarily evolve to a happy ending for all
technologies. Active management of each
technology is required to ensure that it
Assimilation Block.
CURRENT ORGANIZATION STRUCTURES

IN MERGING THE ISLANDS

over time with a series of waves of new
technologies, and at any point must adapt

different approaches to managing and

Data Processing crld Telecommunications

assimilating each, as each is in a different
phase. For example, in 1 9 8 1, a manufacturing company studied was in phase 4 in
terms of its abi lity to conceptualize and
deal with enhancements to its batch systems over a multiyear period. At the same
time, it was in phase 3 in terms of organiz-

It is clear why data processing and tele-

ing protocols to solidify control over the
efficiencies of its online inquiry and data
systems whose growth had exploded in the
past several years. Finally, it had made an
investment in several word processing sys-

processing of data merged some years ago
in many organizations under DP leadership.
In those organizations early data processing applications had to support multisite
situations; thus, the DP staff was forced to
become conversant with the technical
aspects of data communication. Expertise
subsequently developed to deal with minimizing the changes caused by the Bell rate

respect to this technology.

issues of getting terminals to communicate

structure and to resolve the technical

tems and was clearly in phase I with
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to computers.

In the early 1970's the

technical issues were formidable as there
was a clear dichotomy between voice and
data communication since the Bell system

was designed for voice and converting it to
data transmission was a challenge requiring
significant captial investment to obtain

quality digital signals between comptuer
oriented systems. In this situation, it was
natural to separate data communications
(technically complex) from voice communications, and assign data communications to
data processing and voice communications
to office services. In the mid- 1970's, technical changes in the way information was

represented to a telecommunications system permitted voice and data to be dealt
with similarly. On several nontechnical
dimensions, however, initially they con-

tinued to pose dissimilar management

problems: voice (the telephone), a purchased service, was sti I l a careful ly regulated utility, while data communication
demanded increased sophistication on evaluating capital investments in complex

technologies from multiple vendors. However, as the size of data communications
has exploded, the economic advantages of
merging voice and data communications
have become significant.
In 1981, the
trend is to merge voice and data communications policy and operations in a single

department, typically located within the
DP department. For example, a large bank
recently instal led a system to manage
voice

and

data

traffic

by

controlling

switches and line utilization. The system
reduced their communication bill 35% with
improved service to both the data processing effort and voice communication. For

the reasons described earlier, however, it

This path was followed by technologically
innovative DP managers, through extension

of their terminals for data processing into
remote sites. These managers learned to
move words (as opposed to numeric data)
through computers from one site to
another. As their exper ience grew, these
innovators found a great demand for
systems which could store and forward

words to other sites.

Often, the remote

terminals evolved to become more word

than data communicators. As word processing software developed, these DP
managers upgraded their terminals to
include WP activities. Thus, DP assimilated all communications, voice, and data,
and initiated word processing. This pattern's success has been determined by
whether the mature DP organization has
been able to develop the sensitivity to

nurture the new phases I and 2 technologies, instead of smother ing them with
phase 3 controls.

In summary, at present a wide array of
organization structures is in place for dealing with the totality of information services. We see this heterogeneity as transitional, with the eventual merger of these
islands into a central hub occurring in most
organizations; certainly for policy-making,
planning, and control purposes, and in many
settings for line control and execution.
The timing of these moves in any organization is situation dependent involving technology phases of development, current corporation structure and leadership style,
individual retirement plans, current development priorities, and so forth.

has not been an easy task to implement
this merger.

PATTERNS OF HARDWARE/DATA
DISTRIBUTION

Data Processing and
Office Automation

Within the context of the evolution of the
islands of technology, critical organization
issues are embedded which relate to how
hardware and data should be distributed

A less frequent path followed by organizations has linked DP to word processing.

within the organization. At one extreme is

the organization form which has a large
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centralized hub connected by telecommunications links to remote input/
output devices. At the other extreme is a
small or non-existent hub with most or all
data and hardware distributed to users. In

between these two extremes lie a rich
variety of intermediate alternatives.

The early resolution to this organization

structure was heavily technology influ-

enced. The higher cost per computation of
hardware in the early 1960's, when the first
large investments in computing were instituted, made consolidation of processing
power into large data centers very attractive. In contrast, the technology of the
early 1980's permits, but does not demand,
cost effective organizational alternatives.
(In the 1980's, technological efficiency of

hardware per se is not a prime reason for

ceived, can generate need for a large hub
of a distributed network.
Management Control Related: The ability
to attract, develop, maintain, and manage

staffs and controls to assure high-quality
cost-effective operation of existing systems is a key reason for a strong central
unit. The argument is that a more professional, cheaper, and higher quality operation (from the user's perspective) can be

put together in a single large unit than
through the operation of a ser ies of much

smaller units. This administrative skill was
what caused the major decentra lized company identified at the beginning of the
article to not eliminate its corporate data
center and move to regional centers.

In

the final analysis, they were unconvinced
that eight small data centers could be run

having a large central data center.)

as efficiently in aggregate and, even if

To retain market share, the vendors of

and trauma to make the transition.

they could, whether it was worth the cost

large computers are suggesting (as the

comparative difference in efficiency of
large computers versus small ones is

Provision of better backup (in case of
machine fai lure) to users on key online

eroded) that many members of an organi-

systems is another advantage of the hub.

zation have a critical need to access the
same large data files; hence, the ideal
structure of an information process is a
large central processing unit with massive
data files connected by a telecommunica-

This backup occurs through the abi lity to
have multiple CPU's in a single site; when
hardware failure occurs in one CPU,
switching the network from one machine to

While

the problems of a major environmental

tions network to a wide array of intelligent
devices, often at great distance.
certainly

true

in

many

situations,

un-

the other can take place by simply pushing
a button. Obviously, this does not address

disaster which impacts the entire center.

fortunately, the problem is more complex,

as is discussed below.

Key factors influ-

Technology-related

encing resolution of this include manage-

ment control, technology, data, profes-

sional services, and organizational fit.. The
impact of each of these factors is discussed below with Table 5 summarizing the
discussion.

Pressures Toward a Large
Central Hub of a Distributed Network

The ability to provide very large scale
processing capaci ty for users who need it,

but whose need is insufficient to require
their own independent processing system is
another strong reason for a large hub. In a
day of rapid explosion in the power of
cheap computing, it has become easier for
users to visualize doing some of their computing on their own personal computer,

such as an APPLE, or a stand alone mini.
Multiple presssures, both real and per-

However, at the same time some users
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Table 5.

Summary of Pressures on Balancing the Hub

517£

For Increasing HUB

For Increasing Distributed

Management
Control

- More professional operation
- Flexible backup

- User control

- Efficient use of personnel

- User response
- Simpler control
- Local reliability improved

Technology

- Access large scale capacity

- Small is efficient

Data Related

- Multiple access common data
- Assurance of data standards
- Security control

- Easier access
- Fit with field needs

- Specialized staff
- Reduced vulnerability to turnover
- Richer career paths

- Stability of work force
- User career paths

- Corporate style - central
- functional
- Past history of IS

- Corporate style - decentralized

Professional

Service
Organizational
Fit

- Efficient use of capacity

- Telecommunications $ reduced

- Data only relevant to one branch

- Business need - multinationals

have other problems such as large I inear
programming models, and petroleum geological

reservoir mapping programs that

require the largest avai lable computing
capacity. The larger the computer capacity available, the more detail they can

profitably build into the infrastructure of
their computer programs.

Also, in many firms as opportunity is perceived to exist to better manage aggregate
computing capacity in the company reducing total hardware expenditures: With
many machines present in the organization,
if each is loaded to 70%, the perception is

that there are a vast number of wasted
CPU cycles that could be eliminated if the

comfortable adaptation to inevitable turnover problems. Resignation of one person
in a distributed three-person group is
normally more disruptive than five persons
leaving a group of 100 professiona Is.
The large unit provides more potential for

the technically ambitious individual who
does not want to leave the IS field to find
alternative stimuli and avenues of personal

development (perceived technical and professional growth has proven to be one of

Clearly an

the key elements which can slow down

issue in the technology eco-

turnover).
This is a critical weapon in
postponing the so-called burnout problem.

processing was consol idated.
important

more, in a limited staff skills availability
world, consolidation of them in a single
unit permits better deployment from a
corporate perspective. Further, the large
group's resources at a hub permit more

nomics of the 1960's, the significance of

this as a decision element has largely disappeared in the 1980's.
Data Related: Another pressure for the

large central hub is the ability to provide
controlled multiple user access to common
corporate data f i les on a need-to-know

basis. An absolutely essential need from
the early days for organizations such as
airlines and rai Iroad, the sharp reductions
in storage and processing costs have made

this access economically desirable for

additional applications in many other
settings. Management of data at the hub
can also be a very effective way to control

Organizational Fit: In a centralized organization, the above mentioned set of factors

take on particular weight since they lead

to congruency between IS structure and
overall corporate structure and help elimiThe point is particularly
nate friction.
important for organizations where IS hardware was introduced in a centralized
fashion and the company as a whole

adapted their management practices to its

location in this way.

Reversal of such a

structure can be tumultuous.

Pressures Toward a Small Hub
and Primary Distributed
Environment

access and thus security.
Personnel Services: Development of the

large staff which accompanies the large IS
data center provides an opportunity to
attract and keep challenged specialized

In 1981, important pressures push toward
placing significant processing capacity and

challenging problems and share expertise

limited or nonexistent processing power at
the hub of the network.

technical staff.

with

other

The ability to work on

professionals,

not

only

to

data in the hands of the users, and only

attract them to the firm but to keep them
focused on key issues, provides a necessary
Existence of these
air of excitement.
skills in the organization permits individual

Management Control Related: Most important among these pressures is that such a
structure better satisfies the users' expec-

without incurring undue risks.

the majority of transactions locally is con-

units to undertake complex tasks as needed
Further-

tations of control.
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The ability to handle

sistent with their desire to maintain a firm

grip on their operation.

The concept of

locally managed data files suggests that

with other organizations (frequently these

have sounded better in theory than they

have turned out to be in the hour of

the users wi 11 be the first persons to hear

utilization) or buying into something such

about deviations from planned performance
of their unit, hence have an opportunity to

as the SUNGUARD solution (where for

analyze

and

communicate

:standing of what has
planned basis.

their

under-

transpired on a

$6,000/month you have access to a ful ly
equipped unloaded data center in case of
an emergency). For less dramatic events,

a network of local minis can keep key

Also, the users are offered better guar-

antees of stability in response time by

removing them from the hourly fluc-

tuations in demand on the corporate network. The ability to implement a guaranteed response time on certain applications from the users' perspective has

turned out to be a very important feature.

aspects of an operation going during a

service interruption at the main location.

A simpler operating environment from the
users' perspective is possible in the distributed network both in terms of feeding work
into the system and in terms of the con-

struction of the operating system. The red

tape of routing work to a data entry

This distr ibut ion of hardware to the users

department is eliminated and the procedures can be naturally built right into

provides a way for them to remove or

the ongoing operation of the user depart-

insulate themselves from the more volati le

ment.

elements of the corporate chargeout sys-

tem. It permits the users to better predict

in advance what the costs are I ikely to be

(therefore reducing the danger of having to

describe embarrassing negative variances)
and not frequently appears to offer the
possibi lity of lower costs.
Distr ibution of processing power to the

users offers a potential for reduction of
overa 11
corporate vulnerability to a
rnassive
center.

failure

in

the

corporate

data

Companies with very large IS

(Surpr isingly, in some cases regain-

ing this control has been viewed with trepi-

dation by the users.) Similarly, with the

selection of the right type of software, the

problems in interfacing with the basic
operating

system

can

be

dramatically

simplified (to use the jargon of the trade,

they are "user friendly'9.

Technology related: The efficiency of large
central processing units in relation to much
smaller ones was true in the early days. In
the 1980's, however, several important

changes have occurred in the external

budgets where this technology supports

environment:

essential parts of the firm's operations
have found it increasingly desirable to set
up two or more large data centers and split

• The

economics

of

CPU's

and

memories in relation to their size

have altered and this law no longer
&
(Cole,
Gremillion,
applies
McKenney, 1979).

the work between them in a way that, if
sornething happened to one data center,
the core aspects of the firm's operations
could run at the other data center. The
firms that have gone this way have in

• The economics of Grosch's Law were

general been such large users of data proc-

never claimed to apply to peripheral

essing services, that the possibilities of

units and other elements of the net-

arranging backup at some other neighboring site has been impractical.
The
medium-size firms have had the practical
option of making backup arrangements

work. The CPU and internal memory
costs are a much smaller percentage
of the total hardware expenditures in
198 I than they were in 1970.
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o The percentage of hardware costs as

a part of the total IS budget has
dropped dramatically over the past

decade as people costs, telecommunication costs, and other operating and
development costs have become more
significant. Efficiency of hardware
utilization consequently is not the
burning issue it was a decade ago.
When these factors are taken in con-

junction

with

the

much

slower

improvement in telecommunication
costs (1 1 %/year) and explosion of

user needs for onl ine access to data
fi les which can be generated and
stored locally, in many cases the economic case for a large hub has totally
reverseditself.
Data Related: Universal access of users to

all data files is not a uniformly desired
goal. Telecommunications costs and the
very occasional needs of access to some
data fi les by users, other than at the site
where they are generated, means that in

change. The corporate computing center,
an organizational anomaly, was conceived
simply as a cost-effective way of permitting each division to develop its network of individual systems.
It is exceedingly easy for technicians to

suggest interesting approaches for providing information which have no practiccal
use and may even threaten soundly con-

ceived organization structures.
Professional

Service:

Moving

functions

away from the urban environment toward
more rural settings, offers the opportunity

to reduce employee turnover, the bane of
metropolitan area IS departments.
the recruiting and training process is

While
very

in these
settings, once the employees are there, if
sensitively managed, the relative lack of

complicated

to

administer

attractive
nearby
and
employers, reduces turnover pressures.

headhunters

When the IS staff is closely linked to the

or

user organization, it becomes easier to

undesirable to manage all data in a way in
which central access is possible. Further,

plan employee promotions which may take

many

settings

it

is

uneconomical

inabi lity to relate data may be in accor-

dance with corporate strategy.

A case in

point is the large company mentioned at
the beginning of the article which recently

technical personnel out of the IS organization and put them into other user departments. This is critical for a department
with low employee turnover, as the former
change agents begin to develop middle-age

considered abandoning its corporate computing center. The corporate computing
center was a service bureau for its eight
major divisions (all development staff
No common
resided in the divisions).
application or data fi le exists between

spread and burnout symptoms.

even two of the divisions in the company

settings, the controls implicit in the dis-

(not even payroll).

tributed approach better fit the realities of
the corporation's organization structure

If the company's sur-

vival depended on it, it could not identify
in under twenty-four hours what its total
relationship as a company was with any
In senior manageindividual customer.
ment's judgment, this organization of the
development staff, and the lack of data
relationships between divisions, appropriately reinforced the company's highly
No pressure
decentralized structure.
existed anywhere in the organization for

Two-way

staff transfers between user and IS is a

way to both deal with this problem and
facilitate closer user IS relations.

Organization Fit: Also important in many

This is
and general leadership style.
particularly true for highly decentralized
structures (or organizations which wish to
evolve in this fashion) and/or organizations
which are highly geographically diverse.
Finally, highly distributed facilities fit the
needs of many multinational structures.
While airlines reservation data, shipping
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container operations, and certain kinds of

balancing the desires for a strong

banking transactions must flow through a

hub against the advantage of a

central location, in many settings the over-

whelming amount of work is more effectively managed in the local country, with
communication to corporate headquarters
being either by telex, mailing tapes, transmitting bursts of data over a telecommunications link, etc., depending on the organization's management style, size of unit,

strongly distributed approach, and

ensure that different technologies
are being guided in an appropriate
way.\
2.

is not pushed too far, and appropriate diversity is accommodated.
Even within a company, it is en-

etc.

Assessing the appropriateness of a particular hardware, data configuration for an
organization is very challenging. On one
hand, for all but the most decentralized of
organizations, there is a strong need for
central control over standards and operating procedures. The changes in technology,
however, both permit and make desirable

tirely appropriate that different
parts of the organization will have
developed and wi 11 continue different patterns of distributed support
for hardware and data. Di fferent
phases of developrnent, with
respect to specific technologies,
geographical distance from poten-

in some settings the distribution of the

tial central service support, etc.,

execution of significant amounts of the
hardware operations and data handling.

are all valid reasons for different

approaches.
3.

SUMMARY

The policy group must show par-

ticular sensitivity to the needs of
the international activities. It is
inappropriate to enforce, without
great care, common approaches to
these problems
internationally,
either for companies operating primarily in single country, or for the

Re-examinat ion of the deployment of hardware/software resources for the Information Services function is a priority item in
the 1980's.
Changing technology eco-

nomics,

The policy group must ensure that
uniformity in management practice

merging of formerly disparate

technologies with different managerial

multinational which operates

traditions, and the problems of managing
each of the phases of IS technology assimi-

in

many countr ies. Each country has
different cost and quality structure

lation in different ways, have obsolesced
many appropriate 1970 organization structure decisions. To ensure that these issues
are being appropriately addressed, we

of telecommunications, different

believe five steps must be taken.

ences are likely to endure for the

1.

levels of IS achievement, different

reservoirs of technical skills, different culture, etc.

foreseeable future. What works in

Establishment as part of the
mission of a permanent corporate

the USA often will not work in

Thailand.

group, the development of policy
for

guiding

organizational

These differ-

deci-

4.

sions, and the development of a

program to implement them. This
policy group must assess the
current program toward merging

The coordinating group must ensure that it addresses its issues in a
broad strategic fashion. The arguments and reasoning leading to a

set of solutions are more complex
than simply the current economics

the islands, guide the process of
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of hardware, or who believes they
need access to what data f i les.
Corporate organization structure,
corporate strategy and direction,
availability of human resources,
and current operating administrative processes are all additional
critical inputs. Both in practice

and in writing, the technicians and
information theorists have tended
to oversimplify a very complex set
of problems and options. A critical
function of the group is to ensure
adequate R&D investment (Phases
I and 2). A special effort must be

taken to ensure appropriate investment

occurs

in

experimental

studies, pilot studies, and development of prototypes. Similarly, the
group must ensure that proven
expertise
is being distributed
appropriately within the firm to

appropriate places that are often
unaware of its existence of potential.

5.

The policy group must ensure an
appropriate balance is struck
between long term and short term
needs.
A distributed structure
optimally designed for the technol-

ogy and economics of 198 I may fit
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the world of 1989 rather poorly.
Often it makes sense to postpone
feature development or to design a
clumsy approach in today's tech-

nology which

is

anticipated

to

meet the technologies of the late
1980's. As a practical matter, the
group will work on these issues in a
continuous iterative fashion rather
than implementing a revolutionary
change.
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